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KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
TO PREVENT FRAUDULENT 
E-BANKING TRANSACTIONS
ABSTRACT
The growth of e-banking as financial institutions encourage 
customers to do online banking transactions opened opportunities 
for criminals and sophisticated fraudsters to perpetrate and 
abuse customers in their social, cyber and physical worlds. 
This emphasises the need for communication and knowledge 
sharing by the financial service industry to empower customers 
in identifying dynamic fraud from genuine customer behaviour. 
The boundary of liability with respect to fraudulent e-banking 
transactions is shifting from the banking industry to the customer, 
with the emphasis on concepts like co-liability. Despite continuous 
efforts by the financial industry to increase customer awareness, 
the dominating lack of clarity about when clients have acted 
negligently has become problematic, which can lead to loss 
of customer trust and a demand for better security. This article 
addresses the lack of research on this through a critical analysis 
of knowledge management to enhance security and customer 
trust in e-banking. The study investigates fraud prevention and 
available e-security measures, the legal consequences on 
co-liability to negate these potential negative consequences to 
the benefit of both the financial industry and the customer, and 
proposes a conceptual theoretical framework for e-banking fraud 
prevention and co-liability through proactive communication.
Keywords: online communication; proactive communication; 
knowledge management; fraudulent e-banking transactions; 
e-security; customer trust; proactive communication of 
information; knowledge creation and sharing
INTRODUCTION
The following quote by Hoffman and Birnbrich (2012: 390) sets 
the scene for this research to develop a conceptual framework 
for fraud prevention in e-banking: “As banking fraud might 
ultimately affect customer relationship quality and customer 
loyalty, fraud prevention and its effective communication is an 
important topic for academic research”. According to Mhamane 
and Lobo (2012), e-banking, also known as electronic banking 
or internet banking (Yazdanifard et al. 2011), has become a 
prevalent mode for online and internet-based transactions. 
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E-banking offers a variety of banking services, including electronic transfer of funds 
(EFT), automatic teller machine (ATM) services and direct deposits automatic bill payment 
(ABP), a cheaper system when compared with traditional banking systems offering 
customers flexibility and comfortability (Yazdanifard et al. 2011). Despite its advantages, 
this considerable innovation opens up the possibility for fraudulent transactions and an 
intensification in cases of fraud associated with that present tremendous challenges to 
the banking sector to caution and inform customers who do not use this service due to 
fears. It also provides fraudsters with more opportunities to attack customers, especially 
because they are not physically present to authenticate transactions, and might even 
facilitate organised attacks. 
According to Van der Meulen (2013: 713), this fraud is among the most lucrative types 
of cybercrime in contemporary society. According to Wei et al. (2013), e-banking fraud 
reflects the synthetic and integrative abuse on the interaction between resources, which 
includes the fraudster’s intelligence abuse in the social world, the abuse of internet 
banking resources and technology in the cyber world, and the abuse of trading tools 
and resources in the physical world. The results of a study conducted by Carminati et 
al. (2015: 176) highlighted the significant growth of online or e-banking fraud, fuelled 
by the underground economy of malware. According to them, internet banking frauds 
are difficult to detect because the fraudulent behaviour is dynamic, spread across 
different customer profiles, and dispersed in large and highly imbalanced datasets 
(e.g. web logs, transaction logs, spending profiles). 
Although the phenomenon of a “zero tolerance co-liability process on fraudulent 
banking transactions” is mentioned in current literature to prevent or negate potential 
negative consequences, this phenomenon has not been adequately researched, 
understood and conceptualised as a prevalent aspect of shared responsibility to the 
benefit of both the financial industry and the customer. In order to gain academic 
insight into this phenomenon, this study sets out to investigate the means by which 
fraudulent activities in e-banking are committed and the way in which the financial 
sector addresses this through the introduction of security measures, education, 
awareness and the management of knowledge through proactive communication to 
increase customers’ loyalty and trust and at the same time to enhance the bank’s 
reputation and customer retention. The theoretical discussion will be based on an 
extensive literature search using these concepts and inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
The problem statement for this research is that there seems to be no theoretical 
framework to address the applicability of the identified and characterised theoretical 
typologies derived from the knowledge management paradigm and e-banking fraud to 
elaborate on the need to enhance e-security and customer trust. 
KEY CONCEPTS
Fraudulent e-banking transactions
Fraudulent e-banking transactions are among the most money-spinning types of 
cybercrime today. According to Van der Meulen (2013: 713), the increased sophistication 
of attacks has complicated prevention and detection efforts, which in turn has allowed 
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their success to proliferate. This has increased the financial burden on both the 
service providers and the customers, where the latter are running increasing legal 
risks of being exposed to financial losses due to neglect. The internet is an effective 
communication device or tool for providing proactive customised and personalised 
delivery of interactive messages. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2015: 31) emphasise the 
need to educate online banking customers about how to avoid fraudulent schemes. 
According to Andrews and Boyle (2008: 60), the main inhibiting factor for many forms 
of transactions is that of perceived risk, especially in e-banking, which influences 
customer’s perceptions and behaviour to adopt or reject these offerings. Various 
viewpoints exist on perceived risks depending on the predefined perspectives of the 
researchers to reflect the particular context under examination. Because the purpose of 
this study is to examine the need to enhance security and customer trust in e-banking, 
the focus will be on security measures, proactive communication on possible risks of 
fraudulent transactions and how to educate customers through knowledge sharing 
on fraud prevention and the consequences of neglect. This type of perceived risk is 
defined by Sathye (1999: 326) as the security and reliability of transactions; moreover, 
the risk of losing money through fraudulent transactions or that personal information 
might be misused (Drennan et al. 2006). 
Security measures for fraud detection and fraud prevention
The two main approaches used by the banking industry to detect fraud patterns include 
tapping the data warehouse of the third-party (containing transaction information from 
many institutions) by using data mining programmes to identify fraud patterns and fraud 
pattern identification, which is based stringently on the bank’s own internal information 
(mostly through a hybrid approach) (Bhasin 2015). Most fraud detection methods are 
related to credit card fraud, computer intrusion and mobile communication. Empirical 
analysis performed on real-world transactions revealed that most of the fraud had 
the following characteristics: a large number of different accounts accessed by a 
single fraudster; transactions involving small values in many accounts; more payment 
transactions than usual in a single account; and an increased number of login and 
password failures before the occurrence of fraud (Kovach & Ruggiero 2011).
Fraud prevention, on the other hand, describes the security measures to avoid 
unauthorised individuals from initiating transaction on an account for which they are 
not authorised (Kovach & Ruggiero 2011: 166). When fraud prevention for e-banking 
transactions fails, fraud detection is used to identify this unauthorised activity. The need 
for security is therefore a fundamental and increasingly important issue in the banking 
industry, which highlights the need for fraud prevention through proactive communication 
to ensure customer relationship quality and loyalty (Hoffman & Birnbrich 2012). Due to a 
lack of research on fraud prevention, it will be the focus of this study. 
Customer co-liability
Although the general assumption is that customers are not liable and that banks 
refund the financial losses of victims of e-banking fraud, the banking industry is moving 
towards customer co-liability and is investigating the need for a zero-tolerance policy 
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through increased efforts to educate and train customers proactively. According to 
Van der Meulen (2013: 718), and based on cases worldwide, trying to introduce a zero 
(co)liability policy, it can negate potentially negative consequences, by eliminating 
the uncertainty for consumers and simultaneously making discussions on clarity 
and constancy obsolete. Due to the increase in fraudulent e-banking transactions, 
banks are starting to expect more from customers in response to years of awareness 
campaigns and argue that they count on a certain level of awareness that can be used 
as a vehicle to transfer the liability from the side of the bank to the customer. 
This is hampered by two concerns. Firstly, there is the lack of clarity on the qualification 
of gross negligence and care, which can be open to interpretation. To address this 
concern, banks argue that the specificity of a warning allows for the transfer of liability 
to the customer. In other words, if perpetrators use a “known” attack that clients were 
warned against, and are successful, then the customer acted negligently and should be 
liable. This leads to the second concern of consistency, causality and reasonableness 
where the liability can be circumstantial (for example, if any form of social engineering 
was absent, lines of liability were not specified, burden of proof for customers and 
banks, etc.). One line of liability, which clients agree to in terms of use by opening and 
subsequently using the account, is the installation of antivirus software (usually provided 
by the bank online free of charge). In addition, ignoring the warnings of malware and 
phishing/vishing by clicking on links and responding to emails are serious fraud threats, 
but the inclusion of more specific terms of use might reduce the lack of clarity and 
consistency as banks will then be more transparent about their expectations. 
Customer trust
Trust is a decisive instrument in stimulating purchasing over the internet and is a 
determining factor whether customers will accept e-banking. Yousafzai et al. (2003) 
refer to two types of trust in e-banking: the traditional perspective of trust in a specific 
party (the bank), and trust in the integrity of the transaction medium (the web). 
According to Yazir and Majid (2017), trust depends on information and knowledge 
sharing, whilst Reichheld and Schefter (2000) consider e-trust as the degree of 
confidence customers have in online exchanges in e-banking. 
There are arrangements with customers that can increase trust and belief in relation to 
the bank and its intentions. They include reading security declarations and accepting 
them; enhancing communication and transparency about the bank in terms of fraud 
and security; clarifying security expectations; refund arrangement effectiveness; 
introducing layered security strategies and solutions to ensure proactive security and 
comfortability to use it; and differentiating between fundamental and legitimate activities 
that provide the highest degree of protection without overburdening. Prevention tips 
and enhancing security in e-banking is not an easy task for banks because most 
of the attacks have already occurred before the banks realise it. However, they do 
have the following control prevention methods in place: KeCrypt - not possible to 
forge, fake or fool; multifactor authentication; new users who approve or request large 
transfers are immediately associated with high-risk behaviour and should be acted 
upon immediately; and Spyware Protection through built-in antispyware (a personal 
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firewall is another way to do this). Most financial institutions apply these prevention 
methods and have come up with innovative approaches to develop and enhance trust 
with customers through proactive communication and education.
Effective knowledge management through proactive communication on anti-fraud 
management enhances customer relationships and ultimately loyalty and trust 
(Hoffman & Birchman 2012). In the context of this study, customer relationships 
refer to the relationship the bank builds with the customer where the quality of this 
relationship is dependent on the loyalty and trust of the customer towards the bank. 
For the purpose of this study, relationship quality is defined as the strength of the 
relationship to create, maintain and enhance the satisfaction, trust and commitment 
of the customer to enhance long-term customer relationships. According to Liu et al. 
(2011) and Randall et al. (2011), satisfaction refers to the evaluation of customers 
on products and services based on past experience, expectations, predictions, goals 
and desire to assess the quality of past interactions. Ghane et al. (2011) argue that 
customer satisfaction is closely related to interpersonal trust and can be considered as 
an antecedent of e-trust and e-loyalty to ensure customers have the intention to revisit 
the website and make future transactions. 
In terms of fraudulent e-banking transactions, satisfaction of interactions will foster 
customer intention to continue using these services (Ho & Ko 2008). In a study 
conducted by Hoffman and Birnbrich (2012), they concluded that reliable and regular 
communication about fraud and the systems, methods and measures that are taken 
to prevent it will, inter alia, lead to increased levels of satisfaction, knowledgeable 
customers on anti-fraud measures, and fraud prevention that is positively associated 
with trust and commitment. This will ultimately lead to loyalty and successful 
long-term relationships. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Based on the pragmatic realist approach of Miles et al. (2013:7) that there are 
regularities and sequences that link together phenomena from which constructs can 
be derived that underlie individual and social life, they posit that human relationships 
and societies have peculiarities and inconsistencies that make a realist approach to 
understanding them more complex – but not impossible. They agree with interpretivists 
that knowledge is a social and historical product and affirm the existence of the 
subjective, phenomenological and meaning as the centre of social life and that these 
processes should be transcended into theories to account for a real work and to test 
these theories in practice. This article follows a social science perspective, specifically 
communication science, focusing on individuals (not a computer science perspective 
concentrating on technological fixes or psychological approach converging on 
behaviour) through an exploratory, descriptive and critical analysis of existing 
information based on an interpretative approach.
The accelerated capacity of online transactions and e-banking can either empower 
an individual or counteract the threats posed by the increasing fragmented media 
landscape and emergence of independent online media outlets. One way to counteract 
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this is to engage with the online community using proactive knowledge management 
communication by incorporating safety and security messages on the website to 
warn and reassure customers of prevalent fraudulent transactions. This emphasises 
that banks should put in place incentives, systems, methods and measures that are 
more robust to provide for the security of customers’ accounts if they want to impose 
liability from a legal perspective. Because knowledge management is a multifaceted 
socio-technical process encompassing various forms of knowledge creation, storing, 
representation and sharing to the benefit of the organisation and its individuals, it is 
seen as information with specific properties and the introductory stage to knowledge 
(Lueg 2001). Contained in this definition are three key components of the knowledge 
management process relevant to this study: technology (web), human (customer), and 
organisation (banks). Technology focuses on data gathering, mining and knowledge 
construction. The human component refers specifically to the knowledge creation and 
sharing of information through online messages during direct, real-time interactions. 
The organisational component includes the management of four interrelated elements: 
choice, adoption and implementation of procedures/methods to link individuals 
and groups; formal and informal informational settings where interaction occurs; 
organisational practices to address fraud; and the context in which interactions and 
messages are facilitated. 
The knowledge management theory is becoming more and more popular to study the 
proactive management of online communication as one way of facilitating messages to 
prevent fraudulent e-banking transactions. This theory has received recognition since 
the mid-1990s. Earlier knowledge management studies focused mainly on the capture 
and dissemination of knowledge. Since the mid-1990s, the focus shifted towards the 
CoP ideas, which led to the first community of practice (or communities of knowledge 
sharing) that emerged in 1997, and in the virtual world refers to VcoPs (Barker 2006). 
Although most traditional approaches to knowledge management assumed this 
knowledge as relatively simple, approaches that are more recent realise that knowledge 
is in fact complex, factual, conceptual and procedural. A tendency still exists to follow 
the tradition in thinking of communication as the transfer and processing of information, 
but more recently the focus is on proactively communicating with customers through 
the creation and sharing of knowledge (Donate & De Pablo 2015; Barker 2016). One 
of the key discourses of the knowledge management paradigm is that embodied, 
tacit, implicit and narrative knowledge are important phenomena and fundamental 
to all human knowing (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) and an essential part of everyday 
communication because it allows for the transformation, sharing and processing of 
knowledge (Barker 2009). 
The starting point of this study is therefore evidenced in the processes of knowledge 
management as a comprehensive approach to online communication in general, 
and in this article particularly with regard to proactive communication on fraudulent 
e-banking transactions. This is necessitated by the realisation of substantial operating 
costs for banks to refund customers’ monetary losses (Gates & Jacob 2009), as well 
as the considerable time and emotional loss of customers. Customers have to detect 
the fraudulent transaction, communicate with the bank, initiate blocking and re-issuing 
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or re-opening a card or account, and dispute the reimbursement of losses (Douglass 
2009; Malphrus 2009). The consequences for the bank is shattered trust and 
confidence, a feeling of insecurity, a lack of confidence and increased dissatisfaction 
because of a perceived service failure, which in turn affects loyalty and damages the 
bank’s reputation (Gruber 2011). 
Greer and Moreland (2003) suggest that effective [online] communication requires 
customised content-based messages to warn and educate customers of potential 
e-banking fraudulent transactions. It also gives banks the opportunity to (re)assure 
customer trust in their services and allows a bank to evoke a shared understanding of 
values between itself and its customers (Asif & Sargeant 2000) to retain existing and/or 
attract new customers. Knowledge management also allows banks to demonstrate 
their knowledge and competence regarding anti-fraud measures effectively, thereby 
creating a feeling of safety among customers that can improve customer relationship 
quality and loyalty (Hoffman & Birnbrich 2012). If applied to e-banking to create 
awareness for the prevention of fraudulent banking, it is argued that the knowledge 
management paradigm presents a way to proactively manage and control the 
messages that are acquired, transferred and assimilated. 
PREVENTION OF E-BANKING FRAUD
Against the background that internet or e-banking fraud is difficult to detect and 
analyse, it is argued that it is better to communicate with and educate customers 
to create awareness and knowledge through proactive knowledge management and 
knowledge sharing. This will allow banks and customers to build commonality and trust 
on the prevention of fraudulent banking transactions and move towards co-liability 
and ultimately a zero-tolerance policy. This will narrow the gap between bank-wise 
(globally) and user-wise (locally) attribute distributions who will become well-trained 
users on fraud (Carminati et al. 2015). 
Categories of fraud
In the literature, the person conducting it categorises fraud. Two types of fraud are 
identified. First-party fraud is when a legitimate customer betrays the bank; and 
third-party fraud is when the customer becomes a victim of criminals who steal 
identities, the use of lost or stolen cards, counterfeit cards, or gain unauthorised access 
to customer accounts by any other means (Gates & Jacob 2009; Greene 2009). 
This study focuses on the prevention of third-party fraud that falls into two categories. 
Firstly, there is payments fraud that refers to any activity that uses information from 
any type of payments transaction for unlawful gain and occurs when fraudsters gain 
access to and use customers’ accounts for their own financial benefit. Secondly, there 
is identity theft, which might include fraudsters illicitly gaining access to customer 
accounts, but mostly refers to the opening of new accounts in the name of a customer 
(Malphrus 2009; Hoffman & Birnbrich 2012; Sullivan 2010; Gates & Jacob 2009). 
In the context of this study, the prevention of fraud describes the security measures to 
avoid unauthorised individuals from initiating transactions on an account for which they 
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are not authorised (Kovach & Ruggiero 2011: 166). One way to do this is to focus on 
the regulated financial institutions who must consider the security of service providers. 
These include, inter alia, new laws and systems, methods and standards for payment 
activities and instruments, whether new payment types carry an excessive fraud risk, 
who is liable when fraudulent payments occur, how losses are located, what customer 
protection should be in place, how notification of fraud should be handled, and how to 
minimise the incidence of fraud (Gates & Jacob 2009). On the other hand, the move 
towards co-liability introduces the need to manage knowledge and information on fraud-
ulent banking transactions through proactive communication with customers to create 
awareness, educate, and at the same time introduce them to the concept of co-liability.
Types of fraudulent e-banking transactions
Based on the literature, fraudulent processes entail giving away personal information 
to fraudsters through phishing/vishing or malware victimisation. Phishing/vishing 
victimisation is defined by Lastdrager (2014: 8) as a “scalable act of deception whereby 
impersonation is used to obtain information from a target”. It occurs when customers 
respond to a false email, a fraudulent phone call, or a combination. Fraudsters then 
“steal” access data by pretending to be a credible source requesting sensitive information 
like usernames or passwords (Hoffman & Birnbrich 2012). Malware victimisation is 
the umbrella term for malicious software such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses and 
spyware to steal credentials or digital data, or gain control over a customer’s screen 
(Jansen & Leukfeldt 2015: 24). This usually occurs by responding to a pop-up message 
and by installing a malicious application of a mobile device or banking app. 
Despite various awareness campaigns, customers still tend to be ignorant and do 
not read or pay attention to information on their screens that might have prevented 
the fraudulent transaction and/or that they were not mentally able to stop the 
process because of trusting the intention of the fraudster. According to Yazdanifard 
et al. (2011), the cybercrime trends created by malware, specifically Trojans, are 
programmes that compromise the computer without the knowledge of the user. The 
number one worldwide-recognised malware in e-banking fraud, according to these 
authors, is known as the Zeus Trojan ‘defacto’ where Zeus has become almost like a 
brand version of a Trojan (ibid.). 
Characteristics of e-banking fraud 
The most sophisticated characteristics of e-banking fraud are summarised by Wei et 
al. (2013: 450) as follows: suspicious customers are active and intelligent in conducting 
fraudulent e-banking transactions; fraudulent behaviour is dynamic; fraud is hidden 
in diversified customer behaviour; fraud-related transactions are dispersed in highly 
imbalanced large data sets; and the occurrences of fraud appear in a very limited 
time which requires real-time detection. These aspects focus on fraud detection, not 
prevention, but they are mentioned for contextualisation purposes of the need for 
advances in e-security measures.
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Fraud legislation
In a study conducted by Mason and Bohm (2017) in the United Kingdom on the scale 
of bank-transfer fraud and the cost for customers to take action, they proposed various 
new measures and greater liability for banks to ensure that customers are protected 
by law. One such liability is described as “security updates” to prevent fraud, especially 
the legal issue which is straightforward: whether the bank had the authority under its 
mandate from the customer to debit the account. For example, if a card is used at an 
ATM and the correct PIN is entered, the bank can claim that it was the customer or a 
person authorised by the customer. According to Chavan (2013), fraudulent e-banking 
transactions need to have a legal definition, recognition and permission if new methods 
and instruments are developed and implemented.
Potential consequences of a co-liability process
Customers who become a victim of fraud are negatively affected in various ways 
(Malphrus 2009; Button et al. 2014; Hoffman & Birnbrich 2012). Firstly, monetary losses, 
even though it is typically refunded by banks. Secondly, time in terms of the efforts 
customers have to make to restore the original situation. Thirdly, customers might 
lose confidence and trust in the bank and feel that it is not safe and that the bank is 
incapable of protecting their assets and might want to switch to another bank. These 
accumulated e-banking fraud incidents ultimately have a profound negative impact on 
the reputation of the bank. Based on the literature, the potential negative consequences 
for both the customer and bank indicated in Table 1 are prevalent if customers are 
held liable for internet banking usage in general and fraudulent e-banking transactions 
specifically (Van der Meulen 2013; Hoffman & Birnbrich 2012; Tassabehji & Kamala 
2012; Yazdanifard et al. 2011; Jansen & Leukfeldt 2015; Chiou & Shen 2012).
These concepts can typically be viewed in terms of three notable influences of the 
online environment on communication, namely, time and space compression, global 
consciousness and reflexivity, and disembeddedness in single locations (Monge 
1999). In the context of this study, time and space compression refers to the physical 
or “real” presence through new technologies; in this case e-banking, which links 
customers who are removed from the bank to communicate as if they are in a single 
location. In terms of global consciousness, new technologies allow customers access 
to stored information and knowledge in local and international repositories and security 
websites through an interchangeable process. Disembeddedness in a single location 
aids in the reconnection of individuals at a distance by distributing knowledge through 
information to increase knowledge levels, thereby creating a new space – albeit not 
a physical space – in which customers feel safe. This re-emphasises the need for 
increased security and trust in e-banking.
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TABLE 1: POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CO-LIABILITY PROCESS
BANKS CUSTOMERS
Positive
Monetary savings/less cost Increased awareness
Clarity and consistency of 
definitions of concepts such as 
gross negligence
Less time-consuming to react to fraud
Less obligation (‘back door 
escape’)
Access to security methods and 
systems (antivirus software, security 
centres, etc.) 
Increased transparency More knowledgeable on security and fraud through education
Retain customers Increased interaction with banks
Negative
Refusal to refund can lead to 
negative publicity
Perceived risk and uncertainty 
(security/privacy, financial, social, time/
convenience and performance risks)
Loss of trust, loyalty, commitment, 
etc. Demand for better e-security
Lose customers Concerns about cybercrime inhibits online participation (inconvenience)
New methods/systems a costly 
investment (for example, the 
usage of biometrics)
No refunds problematic and cause for 
concern (financial loss)
Actions to be considered in new policies, measures and procedures
Mason and Bohm (2017: 240) consider the following actions necessary by banks 
to enhance trust and responsibility. Firstly, the government must change rules for 
reporting and dealing with theft from bank accounts and provide accurate figures on 
theft and fraud. Secondly, training, education and provision of appropriate information 
technology to security staff on digital criminal activities is crucial. Thirdly, banks must 
put more robust methods in place to provide security to customers with relevant 
incentives. Fourth, consideration must be given to the general rule that machines may 
be assumed to work correctly, which ignores the susceptibility of commercial software 
being manipulated to the detriment of the customer. Lastly, the problem should be 
treated less simplistically by the banks and it ought to be a requirement to inform 
customers that their accounts have been compromised. 
A CONCEPTUAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FRAUDULENT 
E-BANKING TRANSACTIONS 
A conceptual framework explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the 
key constructs, variables or factors that need to be studied and the presumed 
interrelationship between these (Miles et al. 2013). For the purpose of this study, a 
graphical conceptual framework is developed based on the current version of the 
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researcher’s map obtained from a comprehensive literature review and the important 
variables identified in the qualitative research. Based on the preceding literature review 
and key theoretical constructs of the knowledge management process and variables 
identified from existing literature, Figure 1 proposes a conceptual theoretical framework 
for e-banking fraud prevention and co-liability through proactive communication. 
Proactive
communication
Knowledge
acquisition
Trust
E-security
Reputation
Loyalty
Knowlegde
transfer
Knowledge
assimillation
Social/Cyber
worlds
Physical world
Customer
relationship
Fraud
prevention Co-
Liability
(Policy)
Customer
• Phishing/Vishing
• Malware
• Awareness/Education
Banks
• Systems/methods
• Knowledge sharing
• Live direct realtime 
experience
• Context
FIGURE 1:  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR E-BANKING FRAUD 
PREVENTION AND CO-LIABILITY THROUGH PROACTIVE 
COMMUNICATION
The focus in this conceptual framework is on fraud prevention using the three 
typologies of knowledge management to communicate with customers proactively. 
In this context, knowledge acquisition refers to the provision of instructing information 
on the website to customers when a new fraudulent action is identified and/or to 
remind them of existing methods and procedures. It encompasses data gathering and 
mining as well as knowledge construction. Three main types of messages should be 
constructed: basic facts about fraud; updating of existing information and facts; and 
provision of new information and messages to prepare customers for what to expect 
and how to react to it. This is usually done through a security centre website, pop-ups 
to warn customers when they access their accounts, and detailed links to cover the 
broad spectrum and context of fraudulent transactions. 
Knowledge transfer is necessary to move into creating and adjusting the 
communication messages by posting various messages and linking customers to 
websites for direct real-time interactions and by sharing information to ensure them 
of the safe and secure use of online transactions. Examples of possible real-time 
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fraudulent transactions should be included on various websites and links to transfer 
this knowledge to the customer.
Knowledge assimilation should be substantiated through the control and management 
of the messages in the pre, present and post stages of fraudulent actions by presenting 
methods and procedures to ensure safe e-banking transactions, providing informal and 
formal settings for interaction (for example, hotlines and online links), stating company 
practices to address fraud and the context in which it is managed and controlled. This 
is usually corroborated through linking customers to the security centre, online fraud 
updates, media releases, general security messages (formal or informal), and detailed 
methods, practices and procedures to address it proactively and reactively.
It is argued that the knowledge management paradigm offers the opportunity to manage 
and control proactive communication by means of these typologies through a series of 
messages and links to assure customers of safe and secure online transactions. These 
typologies should be used consistently and continuously to create awareness of fraudulent 
banking transactions in the social, cyber and physical worlds of both the customer and 
the banks. Customers should be educated to create awareness on phishing/vishing 
and malware fraudulent banking transactions to prevent these actions. Banks should 
constantly provide systems and methods and prompt customers on existing and/or new 
fraudulent transactions to ensure that the concept of “zero-tolerance liability” becomes a 
crucial concept in the prevention of fraudulent e-banking transactions.
The starting point of this study is therefore evidenced in the processes of knowledge 
management as a comprehensive approach to online communication in general, and 
in this article particularly with regard to fraudulent e-banking transactions. In terms 
of the theoretical discussion of the knowledge management paradigm, the following 
three major typologies indicated above are relevant to this study:
 ♦ Firstly, to acquire knowledge through data mining and knowledge construction 
to address it proactively (whether empathic, reminders against complacency, 
and to address ambiguity and uncertainty). 
 ♦ Secondly, adequate response and attitude towards fraudulent e-banking 
transactions by means of the transfer of knowledge to customers through the 
creation and sharing of knowledge in direct real-time interactions (e.g. setting 
the customers’ mind at ease and ensuring them of the safety and security of 
online transactions). 
 ♦ Thirdly, the assimilation of knowledge to address current fraudulent e-banking 
issues and to present methods and procedures to link customers to possible 
preventative or corrective actions to ensure authenticity and transparency in 
the trust-building process (e.g. through downloading of free software, steps or 
guidelines to ensure safe and secure use of online transactions, reduced risk 
strategies, and media releases).
Although it is realised that the main advantages created by e-banking is the ease of 
use any time and any place, no barriers to access, convenience, and the minimal cost 
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of services, it is also posited that the application of the constructs in the conceptual 
theoretical framework will introduce customers to the importance of co-liability without 
losing trust, commitment or loyalty, or impact negatively on the reputation of the banks. 
CONCLUSION
By adopting a knowledge management approach, the study examined the importance 
of the management and control of messages on fraudulent e-banking transactions. 
This often results in the construction of opposing viewpoints, but a way to ameliorate 
this tendency is to promote the recognition of the fraud and proactively communicate 
messages to alleviate concerns and ensure customers of the safe and secure use 
of online transactions. This emphasis on the managing of messages resonates with 
the knowledge management paradigm and implies that online knowledge creation 
and sharing can be constructed and controlled through the three identified typologies: 
knowledge acquisition, transfer, and assimilation. 
The majority of banks are beginning to exploit their information “asset” for deriving 
of fraudulent e-banking transactions through data mining to gain a competitive 
advantage. Customer retention and acquisition became an important determinant of 
a bank’s bottom line and if these typologies are applied in decision-making, they can 
reap immense benefits and derive considerable competitive advantage to withstand 
competition in future. The introduction of a zero-tolerance and/or co-liability policy or 
measures in future necessitates the need for banks to continue monitoring fraudulent 
transactions, and to proactively communicate and educate customers to ensure 
positive customer relationships and trust. The boundary of liability will also force 
banks to become more transparent and harmonise liability rules to enhance clarity 
and consistency between banks on gross negligence. 
It was argued that the boundary of liability with regard to online banking fraud is 
gradually starting to shift from the bank to the customer and despite various awareness 
campaigns to educate and introduce such a shift, the increase in sophisticated 
fraud attacks makes customers vulnerable to the “involuntary facilitation” of fraud. 
Hence, Van der Meulen (2012: 717-718) posits that the introduction of a genuine 
zero liability policy can negate these potentially negative consequences by removing 
the uncertainty for consumers and simultaneously making discussions on clarity 
and consistency obsolete. It is concluded that this conceptual framework be tested 
empirically to obtain a deeper understanding of and account for the influence of control 
and management of messages on e-banking fraud to address issues like perceived 
risk, trust and customer relationships. The importance of the technology, human and 
organisation typologies of the knowledge management approach is accentuated by 
the following quote: “Sophisticated online banking fraud involves multiple resources, 
including human wisdom, computing tools, web technology and online business 
systems” (Wei et al. 2013: 472).
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